

On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and ex-post Nash equilibrium*

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Abstract

Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable strategy vector implies the existence of an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies that is also ex post stable. Through examples we demonstrate the ‘bounds obtained on the approximation’ are tight.

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